The Philippine claim to Bajo de Masinloc, otherwise 
Introduction
The Philippine claim to Bajo de Masinloc, otherwise referred to as Scarborough Shoal, finds solid basis in international law.
1 The territorial claim of the Philippines over Bajo de Masinloc is strong relative to the claim of China as well as with respect to the principles on the acquisition of territory in international law, in particular, on the basis of effective occupation. 2 The sovereign rights and jurisdiction asserted by the Philippines over the maritime entitlements of the features in Bajo de Masinloc are founded on general principles of international law and consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), which both the Philippines and China have signed and ratified.
3
The Philippines considers Bajo de Masinloc an integral part of Philippine territory on the basis of continuous, peaceful and exclusive exercise of effective occupation and effective jurisdiction over the shoal. 4 The Philippine claim over Bajo de Masinloc is not based on proximity despite the same being located 120 nautical miles ("nm") west of the nearest coast of the Philippine island of Luzon and more than 350 nm from the nearest coast of China. 5 The title of the Philippines is not based on the cession of the Philippine archipelago from Spain to the United States under the 1898 Treaty of Paris and related colonial treaties. 6 In this regard, the noninclusion of the features within the limits of the Treaty of Paris is immaterial and of no consequence.
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This paper adopts the Philippine name of Scarborough Shoal, which is Bajo de Masinloc. This paper treats China and Taiwan as one claimant and assumes that their positions over the Bajo de Masinloc are identical.
The Philippine title over the insular features of Bajo de Masinloc is not founded on UNCLOS. The UNCLOS does not address competing territorial claims, which is governed by general principles of international law relating to the acquisition of territory. However, the maritime entitlement of the features of the shoal as well as the nature and the corresponding rights and jurisdiction over the expanse of water around these features are properly within the framework of UNCLOS. It is indisputable that Bajo de Masinloc is within the Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") of the Philippines and the continental shelf of the Philippine archipelago, over which UNCLOS specifically grants the Philippines the exclusive sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage living and non-living natural resources in the superjacent waters as well as in the continental shelf. 7 Bajo de Masinloc is not part of the Kalayaan Island Group ("KIG") or the Spratlys. 8 The Philippine claim over Bajo de Masinloc is distinct from and independent of the Philippine claim over KIG.
9
The long-standing territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes over the South China Sea have endured for decades. Despite the intermittent diplomatic disagreements and occasional threat of armed hostilities elsewhere in the South China Sea, especially over the Spratlys, Bajo de Masinloc have been relatively uneventful and peaceful. However, in recent times, Bajo de Masinloc has attained notoriety as tension in the region rose to alarming levels over a protracted standoff between the Philippines and China in 2012 and continue to be contentious as a result of an international arbitration case under Annex VII of UNCLOS filed by the Philippines against China in 2013 over the West Philippine Sea and currently pending with the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
This research aims to examine the Philippine claim over Bajo de Masinloc. This paper will be of five parts including Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will provide an overview of the complex nature of the territorial and maritime dispute over Bajo de Masinloc within the context of the dispute over the South China Sea. It will discuss the geography and strategic importance and economic resource potential of Bajo de Masinloc contrasting the Philippine and Chinese claims over the South China Sea. Part three will discuss the Philippine claim over Bajo de Masinloc. This part will expound on the geographical extent, legal and historical bases of the Philippine claim and sovereign acts performed by the Philippine government over Bajo de Masinloc. It will also examine the Philippine claim under international law and consider its implications on maritime boundary delimitation. Part four will outline and discuss current developments in respect of Bajo de Masinloc, particularly focusing on the 2012 standoff between the Philippines and China and the 2013 arbitration case filed by the Philippines against China over the West Philippine Sea.
Contest over Scarborough Shoal: With References to the Dispute in the South China Sea
The contest over territorial sovereignty on Scarborough Shoal is part of, and inextricably linked to, the bigger dispute over the South China Sea. The issue of territorial sovereignty over the South China Sea is complex not only because of the number of parties directly and indirectly involved, but also because of geo-political and strategic importance, as well as its economic resource potential.
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A. Geographical Setting
The South China Sea
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea 11 encompassing an area of around 3,500,000 km² surrounded by the countries of Southeast Asia. The South China Sea encovers a portion of the Pacific Ocean stretching roughly from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the southwest, to the Strait of Taiwan in the northeast. The sea is bordered by Borneo to the south; China and Taiwan to the north; Vietnam, Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia to the west, and the Philippines to the east. It encompasses a continuation of the Pacific Ocean stretching roughly from Singapore and the Straits of Malacca in the southwest, to the Straits of Taiwan (between Taiwan and China) in the northeast.
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In the South China Sea, there are over 250 islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars, most of which have no native inhabitants. These islands can be further subdivided into four sub-archipelagos, listed by area size: (1) the Spratly Islands; 
B. Strategic Importance and Economic Resource Potential

South China Sea
The South China Sea is strategically located. It straddles the main sealanes between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; thus, a major international artery for maritime trade and transportation 16 where over half of the worl's supertanker traffic passes.
The geopolitical and economic importance of the South China Sea renders the secure navigation of vessels in its waters a global concern. The region likewise plays a strategic naval and military role in maintaining global maritime security. 17 The South China Sea, aside from its hydrocarbon potential in terms of oil and natural gas, is also a valuable marine resource. The Chinese estimates that potential hydrocarbon resources (not proved reserves) of the South China Sea at 17 billion tonnes of oil and 498 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 18 This optimism, however, is not shared by non-Chinese analysts. 19 In 2010, the United States Geological Survey ("USGS") estimated that undiscovered conventional oil reserves of the South China Sea range between approximately 1400 Mb and 5000 Mb. 20 This is in stark contrast to the 1993/94 USGS estimate of 28 billion barrels of discovered reserves and undiscovered resources in the offshore basins of the South China Sea. 21 The United
States Energy Information Administration estimates that the South China Sea contains approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves. 
Bajo de Masinloc
The waters around Bajo de Masinloc are considered valuable for the fisheries resources associated with it. 23 Philippine local fishermen from the provinces of Zambales, Bataan and Pangasinan consider Bajo de Masinloc an important source of livelihood, with an annual potential yield of 5,021 metric tons annually. 24 It is also important for ecological reasons being a rich feeding and breeding ground for all kinds of fish and marine species. 25 In terms of hydrocarbon and other mineral resources, available geologic data does not indicate the probability of finding these resources in the area. However, it is believed that the seamounts in the area may hold massive amounts of sulfides and cobalt-rich crusts. The Philippines has also enacted domestic legislation that is consistent with UNCLOS and, as noted above, has revised the baselines from which such claims are made. The Philippines claims a territorial sea that is unique in international law. The breadth of the Philippine territorial sea is variable, defined by coordinates set forth in the Philippine 'Treaty Limits.' In Philippine law, all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago, but within Philippine Treaty Limits, comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines. 40 The 
The Basis of the Chinese Claim over the South China Sea
China claims territorial sovereignty over the entire South China Sea. It primarily anchors its claim on principle of 'discovery' on the basis of purported historical records that date as far back as the 200 B.C. 44 China also relies on an 1887 treaty between France and China, which at that point delimited the territories of China and Vietnam, which was then a French protectorate. 
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China has erected structures on some of them, including a naval airfield on Fiery Cross Reef. Taiwan's claim to the South China Sea is based on the principles of discovery and occupation. 47 In 1946, Taiwan was the first to establish its presence in the Spratlys or, if the dashes are joined up, the "U-shaped line" 49 which encloses the main island features of the South China Sea. 50 However, Beijing has never defined the precise locations of the dashes or provided their exact coordinates. It likewise remains unclear whether the dashed lines pertain merely to the enclosed island features, over the entirety of the waters they enclose, or to both. It is uncertain whether the "ninedashed line" represents a maritime boundary, or a delineation of China's ownership over the islands, or a depiction of its historic title over the South China Sea. 
The Basis of the Philippine Claim over the South China Sea
The Philippines essentially bases its claim to the South China Sea on the principle of discovery and effective occupation. 55 The Philippines asserts that the Spratly Islands were terra nullius when Tomas Cloma, a Filipino lawyer and businessman, discovered them in 1947. On June 11, 1978, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1596, which placed the cluster of islands enclosed by defined coordinates starting from the Philippine Treaty Limits, "including the sea-bed, sub-soil, continental margin and air space" as "subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines." The decree stated that: "These areas do not legally belong to any state or nation but, by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established in accordance with the international law, such areas must now deemed to belong and subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines. 
The Philippine Claim
A. Statement of the Philippine Claim
The Philippines considers Bajo de Masinloc an integral part of Philippine territory. In the domestic local government structure, Bajo The Philippine government asserts that its sovereignty and jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc are based on both the exercise of effective occupation and effective jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc since her independence. 61 The Philippines clarifies that its claim over Bajo de Masinloc is "not premised on the cession by Spain of the Philippine archipelago to the United States under the Treaty of Paris"; as such, '[t]he matter that the rock features of Bajo de Masinloc are not included or within the limits of the Treaty of Paris as alleged by China is therefore immaterial and of no consequence." It is also "not premised on proximity or the fact that the rocks are within its 200-NM EEZ or CS under the LOSC" over which the "Philippines necessarily exercises sovereign rights" but "is anchored on other principles of public international law", namely effective occupation and effective jurisdiction.
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On the other hand, "the waters and continental shelves outside of the 12 nm territorial waters of the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc appropriately belong to the 200 nm EEZ and CS of the Philippine archipelago." 63 In this respect, "the Philippines exercises exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit the resources within the said areas to the exclusion of other countries under UNCLOS", which specifically provides that the "Philippines exercise exclusive sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage resources, whether living or nonliving, in this area.
64
The Philippine position is that "Bajo de Masinloc is not an island," 65 but rather "rocks both literally and under Article 121 of UNCLOS." 66 As such, the Philippines argues that "none of the rocks, which lie in close proximity to one another, generates entitlement to more than a 12 nm territorial sea." 67 The Philippines considers In relation to Bajo de Masinloc, the Philippines alleges as follows: First, "China has unlawfully prevented Philippine vessels from exploiting the living resources inthe waters adjacent to Scarborough Shoal." Second, "China has unlawfully claimed rights to, and has unlawfully exploited, the living and non-living resources in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, and has unlawfully prevented the Philippines from exploiting the living and non-living resources within its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf"; and lastly, "China has unlawfully interfered with the exercise by the Philippines of its rights to navigation under the Convention." 70
Historical Basis
The Philippine interest on the island and waters of the South China Sea can be traced to antiquity. Even during the early period of the history of the Filipino people, predating the four centuries of colonial rule under the Spaniards and the Americans, there were already documented linkages between early Filipinos and the rest of Southeast Asia and China. The proximity of Bajo de Masinloc to the western coast of Luzon, the largest island of the Philippine archipelago, almost certainly implies that there were inhabitants on the main archipelago who had prior knowledge and interest in those features.
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During the Spanish colonial period, Bajo de Masinloc has already been considered part of the Philippines. In fact, the name Bajo de Masinloc, literally meaning "Masinloc Shoal" or 'Masinloc Reef,' was the name given to the shoal by the Spanish who arrived in the archipelago in 1521 and colonized the country for over three centuries. However, the locals from nearby coastal towns of Southwest Luzon, who have long fished in the area, refer to it as 'Karburo.' Bajo de Masinloc has been depicted as part of the Philippines as reflected in several maps released during the Spanish colonial period, as early as 1734. 72 The The Shoal acquired its international name, 'Scarborough Shoal' after the shipwrecked British tea trading ship, 'SS Scarborough' in 1748, which is documented in British accounts. Another map from the 1789-1794 Alejandoro Malaspina Expedition drawn in 1792 and published in 1808 in Madrid Spain and reported in the 1939 Philippine Census Atlas also depicted Bajo de Masinloc as part of Philippine territory. 76 The shoal has been a traditional fishing ground for Filipino fishermen for centuries. It was also noted in early nineteenth century records as a source of pearls of excellent quality. 
Geographical Scope
The Philippines does not claim the entirety of the South China Sea, which broadly refers to the semi-enclosed sea bordered by China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. It does claim KIG, otherwise referred to as the Spratly Islands, which lies in a shallow section of the South China Sea west of the Philippine archipelago. The area covered under the Philippine claim over KIG has clearly defined coordinates. 78 It has also been reflected in official maps issued by the Philippines government and its agencies and instrumentalities. 79 The claim explicitly mentions as belonging to and subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines the seabed, sub-soil, continental margin and air space covered in the said area. 80 Bajo de
Masinloc is not part of the KIG or the Spratlys.
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The term "West Philippine Sea" ("WPS"), on the other hand, refers to the part of the South China Sea that is the subject of Philippine sovereignty and/or jurisdictional claims. WPS includes "the Luzon Sea, as well as the waters around, within and adjacent to the KIG, and Bajo de Masinloc also known as Scarborough Shoal," 82 the 200nm Philippine EEZ and CS, measured from the archipelagic baselines defined in Republic Act 9522 (Philippine Baselines Law). 
Sovereign Acts of the Philippine Government
The sovereign acts of the Philippine Government over Bajo de Masinloc show that the Philippines has exercised jurisdiction over the insular features, especially in respect of maritime navigation. 84 The Philippines through its Coast Guard and other maritime enforcement agencies have exercised administrative jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc for many years, through the enforcement of fisheries laws as evidenced by records showing apprehension of poachers and prevention of intrusions and illegal fishing activities in the area as well as search and rescue operations to vessels that transit the area regardless of flag.
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The argument that the Philippine claim is fairly recent is unwarranted and not Since the 1950s, the Philippines has used the shoal as an impact range for defense purposes and conducted oceanographic surveys of the area with the US Navy, then based in the U.S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Zambales. The Philippines built and operated a lighthouse on Scarborough Shoal in 1965. 90 In 1992, the lighthouse was rehabilitated by the Philippine Navy and reported to the International Maritime Organisation for publication in the List of Lights. Unfortunately, the same lighthouse is no longer operational. 91 In addition, the Philippine flag has been erected and 
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There are other evidence of peaceful exercise of Philippine jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc which have not been protested by any other country. These include hydrographic survey by the Philippine Coast Guard in 1961, and law enforcement operations against smugglers in 1963. 93 The 2009 Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law, reiterating the Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction over the shoal, provided that baselines over the shoal should be determined using the regime of islands provision of UNCLOS. 94 
B. An Examination of the Philippine Claim under International law
The dispute over Bajo de Masinloc is both a territorial sovereignty dispute involving the question of ownership over the insular features, and a maritime jurisdictional entitlement issue. In respect of the first, the Philippine claim rests on the exercise of effective control, occupation, and jurisdiction, which are recognized modes of acquiring territory in international law; on the second, the Philippines relies on UNCLOS and principles consistent with UNCLOS, which embodies relevant rules of international law governing maritime entitlement of coastal States over their waters. 96 In both aspects, the Philippine claim finds solid basis in international law.
The exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines over Bajo de Masinloc a titre de souvereign, as discussed above, has been peaceful and uninterrupted; it has not been challenged by other countries until the 1980s. 97 In international law, the exercise of effective control is considered the indispensable and essential condition of a strong territorial claim. 98 Effective occupation does not necessarily have to amount to possession, 99 but the exercise of jurisdiction and State function on a continuous and peaceful basis depending on the particular circumstances of the case. 100 It is not the sheer number alone that is of paramount importance, but the exercise of "continuous and peaceful display" right up to the moment of the critical date. 101 In respect of the waters outside and around Bajo de Masinloc, the Philippines asserts sovereignty and jurisdiction over the same as clearly provided under UNCLOS. 102 The insular features above water at high tide are rocks which generate a maximum 12 nm territorial sea, over which the Philippines asserts sovereignty.
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The waters beyond the 12 nm territorial sea limit generated from the insular features of Bajo de Masinloc are areas which indisputably lie within the Philippine EEZ and CS. 104 Under UNCLOS, the Philippines exercises exclusive sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the resources, whether living or non-living, in this area to the exclusion of other countries.
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In contrast, the Chinese claim over Bajo de Masinloc covered within its "ninedashed line" claim on the basis of 'historic rights' is problematic under international law. 106 The "nine-dashed line" is geographically imprecise having no exact coordinates, and unstable having been previously composed of eleven segments in 1947, with two lines subsequently removed in 1950. The "nine-dashed line" is also legally abstruse as its official interpretation has been unarticulated. It is unclear what precise rights China claims over the waters and features enclosed within the line. The "nine-dashed line" has received neither international recognition, nor the acquiescence of States. 107 On the contrary, it has been widely and consistently opposed. 108 The argument that the waters enclosed by the "nine-dashed line" are historic waters of China is unsupported under international law. It obviously violates the principle that "the land dominates the sea." 109 The "nine-dashed line" appears to be arbitrarily drawn entirely on water without any reference to a land feature over which China enjoys indisputable sovereignty as a starting point and from which the maritime entitlement should properly extend as provided for in international law. 110 In international law, the legal title possessed by the State over its land territory is the "legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions seaward." 111 As ICJ stated in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, "it is the land which confers upon the coastal State a right to the waters off its coasts." 112 This general rule has been consistently affirmed by a long line of cases.
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The Chinese claim is also inconsistent with UNCLOS. 114 Historic title under the Convention applies only in the delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. 115 It also does not fall within the exceptional regime of 'historic bays' or 'historic waters' as contemplated under customary international law.
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C. Implications on Maritime Boundary Delimitation
Bajo de Masinloc is the primary obstacle in the delimitation of the equidistance line between China and the Philippines. The main problem is whether the features can be classified as islands capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf claims or as 'rocks' incapable of advancing such extended maritime claims consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS. The general rule is that islands are to be treated in the same manner as other land territory. 117 However, Article 121(3) of UNCLOS provides that: "Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." It is highly likely that whichever State ultimately obtains sovereignty over the feature, will claim that Bajo de Masinloc is capable of generating an EEZ and continental shelf rights and will seek to use it as a basepoint for maritime boundary delimitation.
In contrast, whichever of the two claimants does not obtain sovereignty over the feature is liable to argue that it should be treated as a mere 'rock.' If it were to be accorded full weight in the generation of maritime claims, the maritime spaces associated with Bajo de Masinloc have been estimated at approximately 54,000 square nm (185,500km 2 ).
118 That said, even if regarded as not capable of generating extended maritime claims, it would seem highly unlikely that Bajo de Masinloc would be accorded full weight as a basepoint for the construction of a maritime boundary, regardless of ownership. In either case, Bajo de Masinloc would present an extremely limited coastal front as compared to the coasts of either mainland China or the Philippine major island of Luzon.
Recent Developments
A. The 2012 Stand-off between the Philippines and China
The 124 There were also other widespread rhetoric and propaganda from the Chinese alluding to the possibility of armed conflict erupting with veiled threats of using force against the Philippines. 125 In July 2012, for the first time in its 45-year history, the Association of Southeast Nations ("ASEAN"), failed to issue a joint communiqué following its annual foreign ministers meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, over intense disagreement whether the communiqué should reflect the confrontation between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal.
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In September 2013, the Philippines released aerial surveillance photographs which showed about 75 concrete blocks allegedly installed by China on Bajo de Masinloc, which China denies. The Philippines is apprehensive that these concrete blocks could be used as platforms or foundations of larger structures in the area. Memorial fully addressing "all issues, including matters relating to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, the admissibility of the Philippines' claim, as well as the merits of the dispute." 134 The Tribunal provided the Philippines and China the opportunity to comment on the draft Rules of Procedure before the Rules of Procedure and timetable were adopted. The Philippines submitted comments on the draft on July 31, 2013, while China addressed a Note Verbale to PCA on August 1, 2013 reiterating its position that "it does not accept the arbitration initiated by the Philippines" and stating that "it was not participating in the proceedings." 
Factual Background
The Philippines asserts that China's claim to 'sovereignty' and 'sovereign rights' over the maritime area within its so-called "nine dash line" encompassing virtually the entire South China Sea has interfered with the rights of the Philippines under UNCLOS over its own EEZ and CS, in violation of the Convention. 136 In addition,
China has seized control and occupied several small, uninhabitable coral projections, submerged features and protruding rocks barely above water at high tide, as well as claimed maritime zones surrounding these features greater than 12 nm. 137 Among these features include Mischief Reef, McKennan Reef, Gaven Reef and Subi Reef, which are at best low tide elevations and part of the Philippine continental shelf or the international seabed. 138 The Philippines alleges further that China has also seized the following features in the Spratly Islands: Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef, which it considers as "submerged reefs with no more than a few rocks protruding above sea level at high tide."
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In essence, the Philippines is arguing as follows. First, these submerged features in the South China Sea which are not above sea level at high tide, are 'not' islands under the Convention. Second, these submerged features are part of the seabed and subject to the regime of the continental shelf under Part VI of UNCLOS and cannot be acquired by a State or subject to its sovereignty since they are not located in a coastal State's territorial sea. Third, since these submerged features are neither above sea level at high tide, nor are they located on China's continental shelf, the occupation of China of these submerged features is unlawful under the Convention. Fourth, the features which remain above water at high tide qualify as 'rocks' under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS which only generate an entitlement of a maximum 12nm territorial sea and anything beyond this is unlawful under the Convention, as China has claimed over the features. Last, China's exploitation and prevention of the Philippines from exploiting the living and non-living resources in the Philippines' EEZ and CS, as well as the interference with the exercise by the Philippines of its navigational rights over these waters, are all unlawful under the Convention. 140 In relation specifically to Bajo de Masinloc, the Philippines alleges that in 2012:
China seized six small rocks that protrude above sea level within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone; unlawfully claimed an exaggerated maritime zone around these features;
and wrongfully prevented the Philippines from navigating, or enjoying access to the living resources within this zone, even though it forms part of the Philippines' EEZ." 
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
The UNCLOS, in Part XV, establishes a system of compulsory binding dispute settlement ("CBDS") for any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of any provision of the Convention. Therefore, in principle, a dispute between two States parties on the interpretation or application of a provision in UNCLOS, allows one party to the dispute to unilaterally invoke the CBDS system in Section 2 of Part XV. 153 The Philippines is aware of the Chinese Declaration and has avoided raising subjects or claims that China has, by virtue of that Declaration, excluded from arbitral jurisdiction. 154 The Philippines does not seek in the arbitration, "a determination of which Party enjoys sovereignty over the islands claimed by both of them. Nor does it request delimitation of any maritime boundaries." 155 Specifically, the Philippine claims are excluded from the Chinese Declaration, "because they do not: concern the interpretation or application of Articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations; involve historic bays or titles within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Convention; concern military activities or law enforcement activities; or concern matters over which the Security Council is exercising functions assigned to it by the UN Charter." 
Relief Sought
The Philippine arbitration case against China over the West Philippine Sea asks the Tribunal three fundamental questions. First, whether "the Parties' respective rights and obligations in regard to the waters, seabed and maritime features of the of the South China Sea are governed by UNCLOS, and that China's claims based on its "nine-dash line" are inconsistent with the Convention and therefore invalid." Second, whether "under Article 121 of UNCLOS, certain of the maritime features claimed by both China and the Philippines are islands, low tide elevations or submerged banks, and whether they are capable of generating entitlement to maritime zones greater than 12 nm." Third, whether the Philippines should be allowed "to exercise and enjoy the rights within and beyond its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf that are established in the Convention." 157 The Philippines requests the Arbitral
Tribunal to issue an Award seeking thirteen specific reliefs (See Annex).
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Conclusion
The bilateral relationship between the Philippines and China is mutually important for both countries. The Philippine-China bilateral relations have indeed expanded, deepened and are showing every sign of continuing to do so. It is undeniable that China is strategically important in Philippine foreign and security policy for historical, cultural, geographic, economic, and political reasons. At a strategic level, the Philippines is keenly aware and recognizes, in common with other nations around the world, the increasing economic, political, and military capabilities of China. However, Philippine relations with China, while increasingly strong, especially in economic terms, can in political and diplomatic terms be characterized largely as cautious, at best, and even hostile, at times.
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An enduring source of tension between the Philippines and China are contested territories and un-delimited maritime boundaries and overlapping maritime claims. In particular, an influential and often corrosive factor in their bilateral relations is their dispute over the South China Sea. Both countries are parties to UNCLOS and both refer to international law to support and bolster their respective claims. The Philippines and China also both contest sovereignty over Bajo de Masinloc, located in the northeast of the South China Sea, which has been examined in this paper.
The territorial and maritime jurisdictional dispute over Bajo de Masinloc is inextricably linked to the dispute over the South China Sea. The issue of territorial sovereignty over Bajo de Masinloc remains a potential geopolitical flashpoint. While it is clear that the primary reason for the claims is based on its strategic location and its resource potential, this is more than a simple conflict over resources. The issue goes beyond the question of territorial sovereignty and natural resource jurisdiction. This is more than a legal question of ownership.
It is not realistic to foresee the prospects of a lasting and durable solution over the territorial and maritime disputes over the South China Sea in the near future. The escalation of tension and persistent threat of armed conflict are likely to remain and even intensify from time to time. The patriotic fervor that the dispute over the legal status of the islands of the South China Sea evokes among all the claimant countries renders their positions almost intractable and heightens the possibility of bloodshed and military conflict. The solution to this longstanding regional and global concern remains uncertain.
The Philippines, in respect of its claim over Bajo de Masinloc, much like China, echoes the same rhetoric: a solid basis in fact and in law for its claim. The legal framework under UNCLOS offers some options, but the highly complicated nature of the dispute tests the limits of international law and obscures the possibility of a legal solution. 160 More importantly, and perhaps often overlooked, the cultural aversion of Asians against a judicial settlement, where there are victors and losers, almost renders this option illusory. While the dispute settlement mechanism of UNCLOS clearly creates an obligation among the claimant countries to settle their conflicting claims peacefully, it is only triggered as an option when parties are not able to settle their differences by peaceful means of their choice. 161 Ultimately, the primacy given over the sovereign equality of States under international law means that the effectiveness of this mechanism depends on the willingness of claimant States to formally invoke it. The Philippines, from both a domestic and foreign policy perspective, needs to approach the issue over Bajo de Masinloc comprehensively and strategically. It must take into thoughtful consideration both short-term and long-term interests of the Philippines, balancing domestic imperatives that drive a more aggressive, and nationalistic position vis-à-vis China with the shifting and dynamic economic, military and power relations in the region and beyond. China, on its part, should not take advantage of its economic and military superiority to intimidate and threaten. China, on the cusp of being the next global superpower, is at the center of world attention and every indication that the coming Chinese century would not have a benevolent and international-law abiding superpower, does not augur well for China as well as the world.
Ultimately, it is to the mutual interest of both the Philippines and China to work towards the prevention of the escalation of conflicts, particularly military confrontations. Both the Philippines and China should continue to uphold and honor international law, exercise self-restraint and espouse the non-use of force in the articulation of their respective claims. The parties should continue to use diplomatic and other peaceful means to manage and resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea through bilateral and multilateral initiatives, including actively pursuing the conclusion of a legally binding Code of Conduct on the South China Sea signed by all claimant States. The Philippine arbitration case should be 
